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This paper considers the factors needed for a success to have been made 
of joint Franco-British naval operations during the Dardanelles campaign 
of 1915 and 1916. It does so by examining the importance of: joint 
decision making at all levels of the coalition; effective communications 
within the coalition at both the strategic and operational level; and a 




Naval coalitions, such as those of NATO, are common today but were much less so 
in times past. Nevertheless, despite their comparative rarity the First World War 
was not the first time that France and Britain had worked together in a naval 
coalition: the Crimean War of 1854-56; the Second Opium War of 1856-60; and the 
Bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 are all examples of nineteenth century 
cooperation. However, by 1914 these were long distant in the memory and the fact 
remained that when Britain and France entered the First World War they did so 
without recent experience of collaborative naval operations. Outside the main 
theatre, the Western Front, the Dardanelles campaign was the first major combined 
naval deployment of the war. Paul Halpern stated that at the Dardanelles, ‘relations 
between the British and French to a large extent depended upon the personalities of 
the respective admirals’.327 There is little doubt that this is true.328 However, many 
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other factors came into play that determined relations between the allies in the 
Dardanelles operation and these factors will be discussed in this article. The rationale 
for this study rests upon three factors. First, the subject of the Dardanelles naval 
operation has largely been considered at the grand-strategic level to the neglect of 
the lower operational level when considering inter-allied relationships. This has 
resulted in monographs focusing on senior officers to the neglect of their 
subordinates.329 Second, recent scholarship into the previously neglected subject of 
naval coalition warfare makes it possible to ask context-specific questions and 
discover the factors that resulted in success or failure. 330  Thirdly, within the 
historiography of the First World War recent scholarship has illustrated and 
emphasised the critical role of Allied cooperation across all aspects of the war. 
Elizabeth Greenhalgh argues persuasively that Allied cooperation was the bedrock of 
victory.331 She explains: 
                                                                                                                 
327 Paul Halpern, ‘The naval coalition against the Central Powers, 1914-1918, in Bruce 
E. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, Naval Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, (Routledge: London, 2008), p. 101. 
328 DRBK4/32, de Robeck Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, (hereinafter CC). 
Wemyss to de Robeck, 24 February 1916. 
329 Arthur J. Marder, From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the 
Fisher Era, vol. 2, (London: OUP, 1961); Alan Moorhead, Gallipoli, (New York, 
Ballantine Books: 1958); Eric W Bush, Gallipoli, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 
1975); Tim Travers, Gallipoli: 1915, (Stroud: Tempus, 2004); George HY. Cassar, 
The French and the Dardanelles: A Study in the Failure of the Conduct of War, 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971). In France, monographs published during 
the interwar era by the Service Historique de la Marine are too uncritical and lack 
independent distance from the French naval establishment but remain very useful: 
Camille Denys de Rivoyre, L’Expédition des Dardanelles, 1914-1915 (Paris: Travaux 
du service historique de l’Etat-major général de la Marine, undated, 5 vol.), Adolphe 
Thomazi, La Guerre navale aux Dardanelles, (Paris: Payot, 1926). Recent French 
historiography tends to neglect the naval aspects of the Dardanelles’ campaign. It 
doesn’t use the naval archives and is based on secondary material and sources and 
updated monographs: Pierre Rigoux, Les Dardanelles 1915. Une stratégie en échec, 
(Paris: Economica, 2013); Max Schiavon, Le Front d’Orient. Du désastre des 
Dardanelles à la victoire finale 1915-1918, (Paris: Tallandier, 2014).  
330  Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, Naval Coalition Warfare: From the 
Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom, (Routledge: Routledge, 2008). 
331 Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France During the 
First World War, (Cambridge: CUP, 2005); also see, William Philpott, Attrition: 
Fighting the First World War, (Abacus: London, 2014). 
NAVAL COOPERATION AT THE DARDANELLES 
 
124                                             www.bjmh.org.uk 
 
Without a willingness, however forced, to put aside past enmities, 
work in cooperative ways, submerge differences - to create an 
efficient machinery of alliance - the powerful threat represented 
by the Central Powers, and especially Germany, could not be 
beaten.332 
Nevertheless, it is clear, as Greenhalgh and Philpott demonstrate, that the road to 
such effective cooperation was littered with painful and costly lessons. In this regard 
the Dardanelles offers an insight into early war Anglo-French cooperation 
particularly as it falls outside the detailed scrutiny of the work of Greenhalgh and 
Philpott. To provide a similarly rigorous analysis this article makes use of both British 
and French archival material. 
There is little doubt that the fundamental causes of the eventual Dardanelles disaster 
lie at the highest level with a failure among the allies to co-ordinate their military and 
political aims, many of which were in direct conflict.333 A particularly important issue 
to consider is that unlike today when states are willing to accept some surrender of 
sovereignty this was not the case at the Dardanelles in 1915. The politicians, military 
and naval officers of 1915 were products of the nineteenth century and to them, 
national prestige, national interest and personal honour mattered, and mattered a lot. 
Also, professional pride, now, just as then, was fundamentally crucial. What this 
paper will demonstrate is that whilst overtly cordial, relations between British and 
French officers were marked by deep-rooted antipathy and prejudice. This grew out 
of national prestige and interest and was permeated by concepts of personal honour. 
Elleman and Paine, in their ground-breaking work on naval coalition warfare 
identified several factors for success: decision-making; communication; unity of 
interest; equality of partnership; interoperability and burden sharing.334 These factors 
will be examined in this paper within the context of the Dardanelles operation to 
ascertain to what degree they were relevant to the failure of the operation. 
On the eve of the outbreak of war in 1914, the relationship between the Marine 
nationale and the Royal Navy was unequal and unbalanced. The Marine nationale 
believed it enjoyed a special relationship with its Entente partner. French politicians 
and naval officers were proud of the reforms the Marine nationale had undertaken 
from 1906 that had renewed political and professional confidence. Despite this, 
officers of the Marine nationale recognised their service’s inferiority to the fleets of 
the Triple Alliance and consequently, recognised France’s reliance on the Royal Navy. 
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Except for a few individuals, the Marine nationale was an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Entente and all but a few officers wished to see the Entente become a formal 
alliance335.  
The French recognised the global superiority of the Royal Navy and recognised too 
that the Royal Navy had exceptional technological and operational capability. The 
Naval Agreement of 1912 relieved the French of the possibility of facing the German 
fleet alone in northern waters whilst encouraging the view within the ranks of the 
Marine nationale that, by accepting French responsibility for the Mediterranean, the 
Royal Navy was in need of its support.336 Far from being an attribution of British 
confidence in the Marine nationale British attitudes to the Mediterranean were 
complicated. On the one hand former Royal Navy First Sea Lord Admiral Fisher 
encouraged Churchill to view the Mediterranean as a dangerous submarine infested 
lake, well left to the French.337 After all, Fisher argued, ‘What is the use of the 
French Entente if you don’t use it?’338 On the other hand, despite extreme financial 
and strategic constraints Churchill attempted to maintain a substantial British 
presence in the Mediterranean in support of British interests.339 In either case, and 
contrary to French perceptions, there was no British view that considered the 
Marine nationale either a capable or desirable instrument to defend British 
Mediterranean interests.  
On 22 June 1914, the Marine nationale requested that Admiral Henry Jackson, Chief 
of the Admiralty War Staff, exchange secret codes to enable their respective navies 
to practice wireless telegraphy (WT) communication in the Mediterranean in 
advance of any crisis with the Triple Alliance powers. To the French, such an 
arrangement seemed logical given that such arrangements had been put in place in 
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the Channel since the agreements of February 1913. Jackson, in a response to the 
French naval attaché Saint-Seine, refused citing a lack of formal alliance.340 This 
reflected Admiralty policy since the inception of the Entente. 341  This lack of 
cooperation meant that, by the war’s outbreak in the Mediterranean theatre, there 
was a lack of common tactics and signals and the French Mediterranean commander 
Vice Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère had never met his British counterpart.342 Nor, 
indeed, had Boué de Lapeyrère received any instructions from Paris about how to 
organise collaboration with the British.343 
To French admirals the arrangements made under the convention of 6 August 1914 
were an indication that the British had full confidence in their capability.344 After all, 
Vice Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère was designated C-in-C of all Franco-British naval 
forces Mediterranean, and the French were responsible for the protection of all 
British trade passing through the Mediterranean.345 French officers were grateful for 
the fact that Malta was available as a major logistic base for the French fleet from the 
first day of the war.346 All indications were, as far as French officers were concerned, 
that the Royal Navy regarded the Marine nationale as an equal and this was of great 
importance to the French. It was deemed pivotal to the French that the British stuck 
to the agreement of 6 August which placed the French in overall command. Indeed, 
the subordination of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean to French command was 
                                                
340 SHD-MV, SS Xa 1, Secret letter n°12C from the French Naval attaché to the 
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emphasised by an Admiralty order of 18 August that placed Admiral Carden as Chief 
Naval Officer at Malta with Admiral Troubridge as C-in-C at sea and all under the 
French C-in-C Mediterranean. 347  Whatever the impressions or assumptions of 
French officers at this time, as to British tactical and technological superiority and 
their belief in equality, they were to be disabused by the events surrounding the 
Dardanelles. 
As C-in-C Mediterranean, Boué de Lapeyrère adhered strictly to the 6 August 
agreement although, focussed as he was on operational matters, he failed to take 
account of the political effect of the balance of forces between the allies as they 
developed at the Dardanelles and the effect this would have on Franco-British naval 
relations. The escape of the German warships Goeben and Breslau to Turkey 
significantly changed the balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean so the French 
were quite happy for a Royal Navy squadron to be located off the Dardanelles to 
watch for these ships. It made sense when the Marine nationale had to concentrate its 
efforts to cover the Otranto Straits. Furthermore, the Goeben alone was more 
powerful than any French ship. Boué de Lapeyrère regarded Carden’s squadron as 
independent but subordinate to his command.348 The matter was complicated by the 
fact that from September there were two French battleships under Rear-Admiral 
Guépratte349 operating with Carden’s force, and Guépratte, as shall be discussed 
below, was to prove problematic from the French point of view. Boué de Lapeyrère, 
who was reluctant to send more French ships to enhance the Dardanelles blockade, 
continued to give priority to the Otranto Straits. In November, Boué de Lapeyrère, 
and the Ministry of Marine, declined a British offer — because of the continuing 
Goeben threat — to place the French in command of the blockade, although Boué de 
Lapeyrère advised his Minister of Marine Victor Augagneur of his willingness to assist 
his subordinate:  ‘I will always try to provide any help to Admiral Carden he may ask 
for when we are able to do [so]’.350 
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It was clear that the Royal Navy’s officers had little overall confidence in French 
strategic planning and operations in the Mediterranean.351 By far the most important 
factor that generated operational friction from the outset was that as far as the 
British were concerned the Royal Navy simply did not require the assistance of the 
Marine nationale. At the outset, Churchill had informed Sir Edward Grey that he had 
invited French involvement only ‘out of loyalty and politeness’,352 and the French had 
only gone along to ensure their regional interests were upheld. Although it is true 
that French participation was desired in so far as providing what the British initially 
lacked, small cruisers, destroyers, seaplanes and submarines, it is significant that the 
French were not included in the original planning and subsequently, when they were, 
they were detailed off with their own orders.353 Carden stated to de Robeck, with 
some resignation and in recognition of the ‘political’ aspects at the time of initial 
planning, ‘We must let the French take a hand in the opening part’.354 Keyes noted 
British ‘generosity’ in so far as, ‘we gave the French Admiral a day with his squadron 
inside — supporting Agamemnon and Lord Nelson who bombarded the forts at long 
range’.355 But French participation was not received with enthusiasm as Rear Admiral 
Fremantle, C-in-C 3rd Division stated, ‘It might, I suppose, be done using French 
battleships to take a turn [bombarding] but I do not care much for the prospect of 
having a Frenchman under me in an operation where one might require to give a 
good many orders by signal’.356 
Inevitably, grand strategic imperial rivalries re-emerged, especially French sensitivities 
over Syria, and considerable efforts were made to ensure that a final division of 
responsibilities was agreed.357 On 28 December 1914, a memorandum devoted to 
that issue was sent by the General Staff of the French Navy to the British 
Admiralty.358 This interesting document shows that for the first time the Marine 
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nationale agreed to make an exception to French command of  the entire 
Mediterranean as had been established in August 1914. This memorandum proposed 
to give independence to the British in Egypt and Red Sea, in exchange of the 
recognition of France’s pre-eminent role in the Dardanelles and, more important, in 
front of the Syrian coast, which was considered the core of French interests in the 
area. But the Marine nationale’s unrealistic position was quickly pointed out by the 
British — a want of resources — and finally a compromise was found by which the 
French government had to accept the British claims: the attack on the Dardanelles 
was recognised as being ‘distinct’ with a French squadron under Carden’s command 
independent of Boué de Lapeyrère.359  
While the ‘geopolitical’ issues had been resolved, at least officially, there were several 
issues that undermined cooperation in theatre. The first problem on the British side 
was their failure to keep French officers informed at all levels; second was the 
general attitude of British officers to the French that resulted in the latter being 
relegated to subsidiary duties; the third was the failure of the attack of 18 March 
1915. On the other side, the French were insistent on making grand strategic claims 
in the Levant that their naval capability and contribution did not match and they 
repeated claims for operational responsibilities that the Marine nationale was unable 
to undertake. There is no doubt that these issues affected the conduct of 
Dardanelles campaign with the relative imbalance of overall naval power affecting the 
mind-set and approach of both the British and French personnel involved. 
Interpersonal relations and subjective assessments between French and British 
officers reflected the unequal share of burdens negotiated in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. At first sight, cordiality appeared to be the order of the day, 
especially when matters were unofficial; from British sailors from HMS Cornwallis 
chatting with and giving sugar to French troops,360 and French troops helping 
Midshipman Forbes recover ‘his’ trophy (part of a Turkish fort),361 on a prima facie 
basis relationships appear to have been convivial between the allies. At senior levels 
within theatre matters were more complex. Keyes recorded how en route to the 
Dardanelles he played cards with several ‘nice’ French naval officers.362 Keyes also 
recorded exchanges for dinner, as did other British officers. 363  Vice Admiral 
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McClintock of HMS Lord Nelson recorded a very happy dinner at which they 
entertained Boué de Lapeyrère, the retired Vice Admiral Fournier and Captain de la 
Roche-Kérandraon commander of the battleship République. He recorded that all 
went splendidly, although he makes humorous notes about four other French officers 
who did not speak, were ‘fat and of a certain age’ and ‘lunch for them was no 
laughing matter. They tucked their napkins under their chins, squared their elbows 
and cleared for action’.364 Keyes, after one dinner on board Gaulois on 9 September 
1915 recorded: ‘This visit has been a great success. The French C-in-C [Boué de 
Lapeyrère] never liked us before, always rather resented our independence, etc. But 
now he is our friend forever! He and my admiral [de Robeck] got on splendidly’.365 
Admiral Wemyss, commander at Mudros harbour wrote to de Robeck, ‘The French 
C-in-C left here this evening amidst an interchange of cordial signals which I think 
truly reflected the feelings on both sides…he spoke of you in most warm and cordial 
terms and begged me to send you back his very best wishes’.366 Such recollections 
are not untypical but some reflection is required. As will be shown subsequently, 
Wemyss comments are indicative of his known tact, for he disliked the French 
intensely. As for Keyes, he is either very naïve in believing in such a Damascene 
conversion on Boué de Lapeyrère’s part or was very ignorant of the protocol of the 
French naval officer corps that permits no discordant discussion at dinner. By this 
point in the operation French honour had been damaged too much to accept that 
matters were so cordial behind the scenes. Indeed, exchanges were not always so 
cordial. Admiral Fremantle, for example, informed de Robeck of his irritation of 
Rear-Admiral Jaurès who on visiting HMS Hibernia demanded, ‘la salade et les oeufs 
pour la table des officiers’.367  
On the part of the French, records indicate a less cordial scene. British officers, 
although considered loyal, professional and individually gallant, were also considered 
distant and chauvinistic.368 By May 1915 on board Gaulois, medical officer Moreau and 
the commander of the ship, Captain Morache recorded that although outwardly 
matters appeared cordial there was little professional or personal contact between 
                                                
364 Imperial War Museum, IWM Doc Ref, 12295, Vice Admiral J. W. L. McClintock to 
Major R. S. MacClintock, 13 September 1915, Papers of Vice Admiral J W L 
McClintock.  
365 Keyes to his Wife, 9 September 1915, Keyes Papers, vol. 1, pp. 192-193. 
366 DRBK4/22, CC, Wemyss to de Robeck, 11 September 1915. 
367 DRBK4/33, CC, Rear Admiral Sydney R. Fremantle to de Robeck, 30 December 
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368 Vennin to his wife, 27 August 1914, Lettres d’un officier de marine à son épouse, 
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French and British officers with each remaining within their own community doing 
little to develop professional or personal contacts.369 Later at Mudros a decision was 
made by French officers to discontinue the normal official exchanges.370 By October 
1915, Dartige du Fournet was reporting that British officers were adopting a 
superficially ‘cordial’ attitude to French officers. 371  Cordiality, superficial or 
otherwise, was certainly not evident in private communications between officers of 
the same ‘side’. The view held by British officers was not one driven wholly by 
xenophobic national views. Their view of the French Poilu was one of admiration372 
although this admiration was not extended to French black colonial troops.373 In 
reciprocation, French naval officers had a dim view of British troops who they 
regarded as unprofessional, and of the British conduct of the land campaign.374 
The general problem was Royal Navy officers holding a view of the Marine nationale 
that was predicated upon their sense of superiority, which fed through to 
operational problems. It was an attitude that permeated from the top down to junior 
officer ranks. At the senior level, Admiral Limpus made the following comment: 
‘gallant, spirited and charming as our French allies are, they are 25 years behind us in 
hard, practical, dogged sea patrol work. They will never learn in a year how to do 
it’.375 Lt Thomas Haldane, serving on board HMS Doris en route to the Dardanelles, 
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151.  
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Charlemagne, 28 June 1915, Chomel de Jarnieu Family Archives (the author express 
their gratitude to Admiral Chomel de Jarnieu for having allowed them to work on to 
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recorded with a sense of casual superiority, ‘we met the French battleship St. Louis. 
She was trying to destroy a pier by gunfire but could not hit it and so we opened fire 
and pretty well destroyed it with about 10 rounds’.376 
Rear Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss was, according to Julian Corbett in his official history, 
the ideal choice for command at Mudros given his, ‘exceptional experience and 
success in working with the French’.377 In reality, Wemyss’s view was almost wholly 
negative. To his wife, he wrote on 3 March on assuming command: ‘The French, with 
whom I am again Alas! connected are hopeless and awful and of course full of 
promises which are never performed’.378 On another occasion he noted: ‘Alas! From 
seeing the French working side by side with our sailors one’s impressions formed 
previously from naval experience are only confirmed. They appear to be quite 
without method or organisation, and are dreadfully subject to nerves, though 
individually brave and dashing’.379 In truth, there is no shortage of evidence praising 
the officers and men of the Marine nationale for examples of individual gallantry or 
seamanship. 380  Wemyss’s attitude to officers of the Marine nationale as an 
organisation in general, in contrast to the high esteem he held the French army, was 
typical among British naval officers. ‘Talking of General d’Amade…he is the only 
Frenchman that I have come across in the last 8 months who seems capable of 
coming to a decision of or on an initiative. If he is the type of the French soldier, 
certainly they surpass their naval comrades’.381 He got away with his views because 
as Keyes recorded, ‘No one could possibly be better — so tactful with our soldiers 
and the French…’.382 Indeed he was tactful enough to avoid the displeasure French 
officers would later heap criticism on their British allies.  Private papers show that, 
although French officers recognised Wemyss’s skills, they complained that although 
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he could speak French, he deliberately conversed with them in English which they 
took as a deliberate slight on his part.383 
To some degree British perceptions were mirrored by the French themselves. 
French officers knew that the force they sent to the Dardanelles comprised old 
battleships. They were worried about the technical limits of the Marine nationale in 
general compared to the Royal Navy and they were aware that British crews were 
more disciplined than their French counterparts. They were particularly concerned 
that no incident should occur that would tarnish the image of the Marine nationale 
before their British ally.384 Nevertheless, French disillusionment set in early with the 
arrival at the Dardanelles in November of additional French warships increasing the 
French force under Guépratte to battleships Gaulois, Suffren, St. Louis and Verité, six 
destroyers and three submarines. Accordingly, more French officers began to get 
first-hand experience of the Royal Navy at work, and its limitations. Lieutenant 
Vennin explained to his wife that:  
And, well, you see, there’s nothing like to be next to the others 
to compare and judge by yourself. By seeing closely the British 
Navy, many of my illusions are dispelling […]. Well, we don’t have 
at all to suffer from comparison with it. I don’t want to say more 
by letter, but I shall not to hide you that I’m glad to have a closer 
look on these self-imagined demi-gods.385 
The British superiority complex mixed with certitude that they did not need major 
operational help from a less effective French fleet paved the way to exclude the 
French from intelligence and operational planning. Very early indications were that 
the British were acting autonomously and did not keep Boué de Lapeyrère 
informed.386 What he regarded initially as a lack of professional courtesy was the 
germ of what became an increasingly fractious dispute as events developed. A 
situation which the French regarded as one of initial mutual confidence and respect 
led ultimately to disappointment, disillusionment and bitterness. Failure to keep 
French command informed of decisions made by Royal Navy officers undermined 
gallic notion that officers of the Royal Navy regarded officers of the Marine nationale 
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as equals. It was clear that the British planned and undertook operations without 
reference to the French at all levels. Boué de Lapeyrère only discovered the 
preparations undertaken from January 1915 because Guépratte, his man on the spot, 
had requested logistic supplies from Bizerta. 387  That Carden was planning an 
operation without referring to Boué de Lapeyrère was bad enough; that Guépratte 
should later disclose to Boué de Lapeyrère he had been told by Carden not to 
inform Boué de Lapeyrère was even worse.388 This British indifference to French 
sensitivities continued into the campaign. On 25 May 1915 following a visit to Malta, 
Rear Admiral Cecil Thursby, commander of the 2nd Squadron at the Dardanelles, 
informed de Robeck, now C-in-C Dardanelles that: ‘I called on the French C-in-C. 
He is a decent old chap but I think feels he is rather left out in the cold as operations 
presently take place in his command without his knowledge vide the bombardment 
of Smyrna’.389 As for the Smyrna bombardment itself, Boué de Lapeyrère was left to 
discover events through Reuters though, when he asked for information from de 
Robeck, he admitted the latter disclosed the information, ‘very gallantly’.390  
British officers for their part only confirmed the opinion of French officers by 
maintaining their sense of superiority and for persisting, in the view of the French, in 
making poor tactical and strategic decisions. These perceptions were derived from 
experience. It is perhaps Dartige du Fournet who best illustrates this experience of 
French officers when working with the British. Dartige du Fournet, successor to 
Boué de Lapeyrère as C-in-C Mediterranean from October 1915, was a firm 
supporter of the Entente and of an alliance; he also sincerely admired the Royal Navy. 
After his first meeting with de Robeck and other senior British officers, he reported 
to his minister, Victor Augagneur, that he was certain that the British sincerely 
desired to develop operational cooperation and integration and include French naval 
forces far more in their pursuit of the campaign. He concluded definitively: ‘History is 
full of disagreements which paralysed so many coalitions, and so often created 
opposition between generals and admirals. I am convinced there will be nothing like 
that in the Dardanelles’.391 One month later, his state of mind was now dominated 
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by bitterness after being excluded from operational planning by the British. He 
denounced the British as an unfair, incompetent ally:  
Unfortunately, it is obvious that the Marine nationale is 
considered here as a kind of reserve force, only dedicated to 
support foreign operations. We’re going to be excluded from 
their genesis and their direction till the day when the Marine 
nationale will have to compensate for [British] mistakes ... she 
won’t be responsible for these errors but she will have to support 
their consequences. I don’t talk about success because there are 
tiny opportunities for us to be put in position to get it and, in 
general, to honour his ally for a success is unusual, even if you 
owe it to him.392  
The British trend to provide little operational and tactical information to the French 
and to appoint them only for secondary tasks was enhanced by the predominance of 
British telegraphic communications which always remained a major problem for the 
Marine nationale. The French were wholly dependent on the British for 
communications and intelligence such that when in February 1915 Boué de 
Lapeyrère needed to communicate with French naval forces in the Aegean he had to 
use British systems and codes, which only the British officers possessed. This meant 
his communications to his subordinates were known first and in full to the British.393 
Within theatre too, the British were determined to control communications, 
especially wireless telegraphy (WT). The operational orders, which were written by 
the British, contained detailed arrangements for signals by WT, flag and searchlight, 
especially for spotting and directing fire. For the initial bombardments, Guépratte’s 
ship, Suffren, had four Royal Navy signals ratings seconded to ensure the efficient 
interpretation of signals.394 Staff officers too were exchanged to facilitate effective 
communication.395 Nevertheless, despite these sensible arrangements, Vice Admiral 
Nicol396 recorded that de Robeck, although consistently courteous, refused to share 
information with him or integrate French forces within Royal Navy operations 
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preferring instead to delegate the Marine nationale to secondary tasks.397 Captain van 
Gaver, in command of Charlemagne, recorded that, although relations with Royal 
Navy officers were not bad, communication was very limited and he complained that 
he was not properly informed by his British counterparts regarding forthcoming 
operations. He noted that, even as late as May 1915, there were no French officers 
detached to work with British army batteries and that French ships were not 
provided the codes for British army batteries which meant that he had to ask HMS 
Agamemnon to decode messages.398  
Even in theatre, a fundamental problem for the French was that the British were 
determined to control communications, despite the codes having been distributed in 
orders, and personnel being exchanged, communications remained problematic. Lt 
Cdr Somerville, the officer responsible for WT at the Dardanelles, had constant 
problems controlling its use by airmen, soldiers and especially the French.399 It was a 
persistent problem that was referred to the highest levels.400 WT had two distinct 
problems. The first was that too much traffic caused confusion; the second was the 
lack of security. For Somerville, the French WT sets were seen as ‘A1’ but at crucial 
times they failed causing him great stress.401 However, he was constantly having to 
intervene to curtail WT use. On one occasion, the French proposed using WT 
ashore to improve communications but the British response was that it: ‘would really 
hash up everything … line is must be stopped at all costs’.402 On another occasion, 
when the need was to maintain security as the land forces were mobilising for the 25 
April landings, he recorded with some irritation and humour: ‘Operations ordered to 
commence and transports started to pour out of the harbour for their rendezvous. I 
had to go ashore and seal up the French WT station. Its naval commandant was 
furious but the operators didn’t seem to mind much’.403 For the French, this was all a 
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source of considerable frustration and a problem never really solved for all the 
measures put into effect.404  
The failure of the 18 March bombardment did much to undermine the image of the 
Royal Navy in the opinion of French officers and it was a major turning point from 
which the reputation of the Royal Navy and its senior officers never recovered in 
French eyes. The attack was not supported at the most senior levels of French 
command in any event.405 This loss of professional respect by French naval officers of 
their Royal Navy counterparts, especially when seen in conjunction with the failure 
to communicate openly, meant increasingly that French officers, with the exception 
of Guépratte, regarded the Royal Navy with growing contempt for what they 
regarded as its arrogance and incompetence. According to Lieutenant Vennin:  
The British had made an unforgivable mistake not to act in August 
[1914], by not following the Goeben when it entered in the 
Dardanelles. In October, in November, in December, in January, 
it was still easy to enter in the Strait because the Turkish were 
not on their guard and they didn’t believe it was possible. In 
February, it was still possible forcing through. But in March, it was 
too late, especially after the attack of March 18th so badly led 
which warned the Turkish.406  
The commander of Gaulois was harsher, probably because his ship was severely 
damaged during the attack: ‘From the naval point of view especially, the heaviest 
faults have been done’.407 This state of mind was very common among French naval 
officers serving in the Dardanelles and it was shared in Paris. In private, members of 
the French Council of Ministers were similarly severely critical of the Royal Navy’s 
inability to manage the operation.408 
Indeed, operational cooperation was fraught with difficulty. The reality was that the 
allies did not have what today would be regarded as Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) and this meant they went about operations in their own way often to the 
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irritation of each other. The Royal Navy traditionally operated with maximum sea-
time and one of the most common complaints from Royal Navy officers was that the 
French were always in port.409 As Wemyss complained:  
As regards berthing of ships, [at Mudros] double berthing doesn’t 
help me a bit as far as men of war are concerned. It is a case of 
depth of water, and the Frenchmen take up all the billets. They 
really are the limit. It makes me mad…and our ships out for such 
long periods, and then no room for them when they want to 
come in…410  
Later he recorded with even greater frustration: ‘they do little or no work and only 
take up valuable space and time. They are tiresome and I am beginning to look upon 
them with feelings far from amicable’.411 
French naval forces were to a large extent reliant upon the British for logistics 
support in theatre. Lieutenant Vennin, in command of the destroyer Sape, was 
particularly impressed by the efficiency of the administration at Malta and the ability 
of British logistics operations to bring in personnel, ships and supplies to the 
theatre.412 Nevertheless, for the British this French dependency was a source of 
irritation.413 Wemyss, C-in-C Mudros and hence responsible for logistics in theatre, 
recorded: ‘they not only do nothing but they actually want everything.’ 414 On 
another occasion he railed to his wife:  
Imagine my feelings this morning there appears on the scene a 
French General who informs me he is the precursor of French 
Army who has apparently been told that I will supply them with 
all they need. Truly the ways of those in authority is beyond 
thought…the French are quite enough.415  
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At times these small issues resulted in petty breakdowns of cooperation. Captain 
Edward Unwin VC, when securing the use of the River Clyde, discovered she had 
aboard 100 tons of French supplies. Despite having the approval of the French 
admiral, the local French officer so disapproved of Unwin’s requisition that he 
refused to allow his men help the unloading which Unwin and his men had to do 
overnight.416 It was also clear that the French had to rely on British support when 
ships required repair, especially in emergency. When Gaulois was torpedoed and 
beached it was carpenters and divers from HMS Cornwallis who repaired the 
damage.417 Similarly when Suffren was torpedoed British divers also repaired her, 
with Keyes recording, apparently with some satisfaction: ‘The French Admiral made 
most gallant signals, but they are very helpless and looked on with folded hands doing 
nothing, full of gratitude and admiration for the energy of their dear allies’.418 
Among British officers there was a general attitude that the French, for all their 
individual gallantry were not up to the job and neither was their technology.419 These 
factors fed through to operational problems with submarines the most exasperating 
problem. In the minds of British officers the presence of German submarines in the 
Mediterranean was primarily the fault of the French, after all they were in 
command.420 As for submarines operating at the Dardanelles, the French were again 
blamed for ineffective patrols.421 British officers were also incredulous at the way the 
French operated despite the submarine menace. Somerville recorded two incidents 
that annoyed him in particular: ‘Great excitement in the forenoon when French 
reported a German submarine in difficulties off Kereves Dere. All destroyers rushed 
to attack but submarine got away. It was there an hour and the blasted Frenchman 
thought it was ours. They are the limit!’422 He later recorded that, despite the great 
submarine menace: ‘Left Mudros at 4pm. Fine hot day. Passed Henry IV gaily steaming 
                                                
416 IWM1343, Papers of Captain Edward Unwin VC, p. 1 & p. 8. 
417 Stewart & Pershall, The Immortal Gamble, p. 53; Keyes to his wife, 27 March 
1915, Keyes Papers, vol. 1, p. 117. 
418 Keyes to his wife, 27 March 1915, Keyes Papers, vol. 1, p.117. 
419 DRBK 4/31 CC, Jackson to de Robeck, 7 November 1915; DRBK 4/32 CC, 
Wemyss to de Robeck, 14 July 1915; DRBK 4/39 CC, Burmester to de Robeck, 25 
November 1915; SMVL 1/6, CC, ‘Somerville Diary’, 9 November 1915.  
420 DRBK 4/36, CC, Limpus to Carden 14 March 1915; DRBK 4/36, CC, Limpus to 
de Robeck 12 November 1915.  
421 DRBK 4/31, CC, Jackson to de Robeck, 29 January 1916; DRBK 4/35, CC, 
Thursby to de Robeck 25 May 1915; DRBK 4/38, CC, Captain Rudolf Burmester to 
de Robeck, 5 November 1915. 
422 SMVL 1/6, CC, Somerville Diary, Thursday 17 June 1915.  
NAVAL COOPERATION AT THE DARDANELLES 
 
140                                             www.bjmh.org.uk 
 
towards Helles at 9 knots, no escort or anything. The French are the limit!’423 
However, French officers were similarly astonished at British attitudes to the 
submarine problem. French officers record the same general and persisting lack of 
caution on the part of Royal Navy’s major surface units against mines and submarines 
compared to French attitudes. French officers regarded British modes of operation 
as most unprofessional and irresponsible;424 Admiral Nicholson in particular was 
singled out as responsible for the loss of HMS Majestic, in exactly the same 
circumstances as had occurred a few days before, of HMS Triumph and for failing to 
take account of the submarine threat.425 Somerville recorded that the French were 
similarly at fault: ‘French transport Carthage sunk by submarine off Helles, not 
surprised as she had been there three days’.426 In reality these examples are more 
probably expressions of the fact that there was no solution to the submarine threat 
but they also indicate considerable discordancy among allies. 
Two further issues that irritated the British were interrelated. Firstly, a French 
determination to undertake as much work as possible. Secondly, the fact that they 
had insufficient resources to do so. This was particularly the case with patrols against 
submarines.  Wemyss complained to de Robeck in September: ‘I have asked the 
French if they could assist me by taking their share of the island patrol, which is at 
present entirely run by English [sic] boats, but they say they are unable to do it.’427 
Similarly, Captain Rudolf Burmester of HMS Euryalus, recorded that in pursuit of 
submarines near Budrum and Mandilyeh Gulf he was:  
to cooperate with French patrol vessels in search of the latter 
area in two days’ time. I have not been able to persuade the 
Captain of Henry IV to move earlier…Henry IV is keen on doing 
what he can, but he is greatly handicapped having lost all his 
destroyers and several trawlers, taken to escort troopers. The 
result is that their coastline which wants a large number of craft 
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to look after it is not visited, and I have no doubt that even the 
[French] vessels on patrol spend most of their time in harbour.428 
French concerns at the opening of the campaign that their ships were technologically 
inferior were borne out in the views held by British officers, notwithstanding the fact 
that except for Queen Elizabeth and Inflexible, the British contribution in naval vessels 
was also decidedly second-rate. Admiral Limpus recorded: ‘The French have no fast 
cruisers…and their destroyers can’t stand the work that ours can.’ 429  Keyes 
recorded on 15 March 1915 that: ‘the French Squadron consisted of Suffren, Gaulois, 
Charlemagne and Bouvet. They had done very well, but they, I mean the ships, not the 
personnel, can’t stand much knocking about and they are rather a cause of 
anxiety’.430 Carden, when handing over to de Robeck noted: ‘The old type French 
battleships in the squadron are unable to make good the loss of fresh water…their 
coaling is very slow, and their machinery is apparently not in good condition…’431 
Conversely, after 18 March, a more critical French eye noted that in reality, the 
French warships at the Dardanelles were proving to be more resilient to damage 
than the British warships. Captain Morache of Gaulois proudly noted that the British 
themselves acknowledged this fact when working on the torpedo damaged Jean 
Bart.432 
For operational tasks, French mines and minesweeping were also a concern for the 
British; Lt Commander John Godfrey, then on board HMS Euryalus, was tasked with 
laying French mines. He recorded the following over several days: ‘The mines are 
French…and are supposed to be unsafe to handle.’ He noted that French sal-
almoniac plugs were ‘unsatisfactory’ [i.e. they detonated prematurely]. Next, ‘The 
Casabianca has sunk, blown up by the first mine she laid last night. These French 
mines seem to be a great danger to any ship that lays them’. Finally, ‘I cannot say I 
look forward with any pleasure to laying anymore of these French mines’.433 The 
mine issue and the loss of Casabianca was noteworthy enough for Keyes to record 
the event.434 Minesweeping was a problem for both parties but the French system 
added problems as far as the execution of sweeping in the Straits. Keyes recorded 
that the British system differed and the most noteworthy difference was that it took 
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5 minutes for a British minesweeper to deploy but a French one took 30 minutes. 
This had consequences and so the following deserves detailed consideration.  
The C. O. of the French [minesweepers], who were given a free 
hand on the night of the 11th [March], meant to try to get above 
the mine field, but he decided they couldn’t risk half an hour [to 
deploy] under a heavy fire stopped, so he tried to sweep against 
the current. After a bit, as he was making no headway, they 
withdrew. So once again, we had to say that we had no headway 
owing to a heavy fire — which caused no casualties!435  
This is as close to an accusation of cowardice as one can get! Reciprocally, British 
mine warfare was severely criticised by the French. Vice Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère 
complained about the Royal Navy’s material deficiencies. He reported that the British 
systems were less efficient than the French.436 The commander of the French 
minesweeping flotilla underlined the persistent inefficiency of the British operations: 
‘It seems to me, there is no direction for minesweeping: everybody operates 
haphazardly’. In his view, cooperation was very limited because of the British: ‘I feel 
we’re just borne by the British and that we’re considered first of all as spectators’.437 
Nevertheless, despite the French experience of working with a far from perfect 
Royal Navy, and the many negative impressions formed as a consequence, it 
remained the case that the Marine nationale retained a complex mix of feelings of 
inferiority, disappointment and rivalry. Throughout the Dardanelles operations. 
French personnel remained very sensitive to the British opinion of them and 
welcomed with pride British expressions of favour.438 Nevertheless, at the French 
equivalent of the Dardanelles Commission, Victor Augagneur, the French Minister of 
Marine at the time of the operation, spread the blame widely and of the Royal Navy 
he stated: ‘the British have the idea that they have the world’s first navy, true 
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perhaps, at least formerly. [But] They can’t accept the smallest of their ships under 
command of a man who is not British’.439  
On both sides, as Thomazi and Halpern have noted, individual characters and skills 
played a key role. De Robeck and Guépratte embody and are the focus of British and 
French critics alike who emphasise their personal responsibility for the Dardanelles 
failure. There is something of a parallel between these two national scapegoats but 
criticism is not skewed by nationality, criticism came equally from both British and 
French officers. As noted before, following the 18 March failure French officers 
revised their presuppositions regarding, amongst other issues, British technical, 
tactical and general superiority. Admiral de Robeck attracted most of the ire of 
French officers. With the exception of Guépratte, who regarded the real culprit as 
Churchill. 440 French officers focused their attacks on de Robeck’s military skill, 
character and his utter hostility to French interests. Following his own experience, 
Dartige du Fournet completely reconsidered his opinion of the possibility of effective 
cooperation and writing just four months after his favourable comments to 
Augagneur of 2 October 1915 he informed his chief: ‘Even though cooperation is 
strong between Admiral de Robeck and me, the differences of national character and 
state of mind are too great between officers and men of both nations to facilitate 
parallel cooperation in any area with success’.441 Although Keyes’s papers suggest 
that de Robeck was disinclined to pursue a further naval only attack, Dartige du 
Fournet took the view that de Robeck was driven by nothing but revenge following 
the 18 March failure.442 De Robeck was, in the opinion of Captain van Gaver, captain 
of Charlemagne, foolhardy, arrogant, a braggart and incompetent.443 Ultimately, from 
the French perspective it was the refusal of Royal Navy officers, de Robeck in 
particular, to receive French advice on the conduct of the campaign that resulted in 
                                                
439 SHD-MV, SS Ca 9, ‘Audition de Victor Augagneur par la Commission de la Marine 
de Guerre de la Chambre’, 18 July 1917. 
440 SHD-MV, SS Ob 2, Report n°102, from Rear Admiral Guépratte to Vice Admiral 
Boué de Lapeyrère, 21 May 1915. 
441 SHD-MV, SS Ed 84, Report n°25 M-S, from Vice Admiral Dartige du Fournet to 
French Minister of Marine, 8 February 1916.  
442 Proposal by Keyes for a Renewal of the Naval Attack on the Dardanelles and de 
Robeck’s Comments’, Keyes Papers, vol. 1, pp. 188-192; SHD-MV, SS Ed 84, Report 
n°4S, from Vice Admiral Dartige du Fournet to French Minister of Marine, 5 January 
1916.  
443  Papers of Commodore Amédée Van Gaver, Diary kept aboard battleship 
Charlemagne, 20-25 May 1915 & 07 June 1915, Chomel de Jarnieu Family Archives. 
NAVAL COOPERATION AT THE DARDANELLES 
 
144                                             www.bjmh.org.uk 
 
its eventual failure, and in particular a British refusal to land on the Asiatic side of the 
Straits.444 
Guépratte is a complex figure in an assessment of relationships at the Dardanelles. 
As commander of French forces, he was subordinate to Carden and then de Robeck, 
and like de Robeck, his position carried with it both military and political burdens. 
Militarily, his job, after supporting the British, was to ensure that he protected his 
ships and men from unreasonable risk. Politically, he should have ensured that French 
interests were represented and upheld. After several months on station the 
authorities in France had concluded he had done neither. Dubbed the ‘fire eater’, 
Guépratte was loved by the British:445 ‘a gallant old fellow spoiling to fight’, recorded 
Keyes. 446 When advised that Guépratte was to be replaced, British officers recorded 
their views with various degrees of irritation and regret. De Robeck informed 
Limpus: ‘Private. Have they told you about the future and the new formation of the 
squadron out here? Don’t like it at all! They are sending a French V. A. up here 
senior to Guépratte, which is a great mistake; dear old soul he is the most loyal 
friend one could have and hate anybody coming between us!’447 It is certainly 
noteworthy that as a rule Rear Admiral Guépratte is usually celebrated within the 
Royal Navy and Vice Admiral Nicol within the Marine nationale.  
The decision on Augagneur’s part to replace Guépratte had two aims; the first was 
to get a French admiral on the spot, equal in rank to de Robeck, and thereby 
neutralise his influence; the second was to ensure French interests were represented 
effectively. Vice Admiral Nicol was known to be loyal to Boué de Lapeyrère and to 
be an excellent commander.448 French officers quickly appreciated the change in tone 
and appreciated too his less accommodating and passive attitude to de Robeck, in full 
contrast to that of Guépratte.449 Morache noted that: ‘although he was subordinate 
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to de Robeck, he knew how to keep his independence’.450 Nicol’s impact was noted 
by de Robeck somewhat spitefully:  
 
[I]t is very hard to get this new French V. A. to do anything, he 
will do nothing as well as anyone…Nicol is a very different man 
from dear old Guépratte who is a gallant fellow and the most 
loyal friend! Nicol is a little man of the most unprepossessing 
appearance; does not look a gentleman and don’t think his name 
would be in the ‘Stud Book’! We get on very well with the French, 
but they want everything and do as little as possible (most of 
them). It was a great pity the French Admiralty did not leave 
Guépratte here in command.451  
No doubt de Robeck missed Guépratte’s compliant character. The question remains, 
to what degree was Guépratte ‘compromised’? There is little doubt that among 
French officers he was bitterly criticised for his overfamiliarity with the British and 
his failure to represent French interests resulted in a sense of a loss of French 
independence. Commodore Edmond Delage, a teacher at the French Naval Academy, 
recorded that he was: ‘the most obliging collaborator’.452 Indeed in January 1915 
Guépratte was confronted by Admiral Docteur who, recognising Guépratte’s 
collusion with the British in keeping information from Lapeyrère, stated: ‘I am 
wondering if you have not become a British admiral’.453  Guépratte was alone among 
the French in his view that at the Dardanelles all was well between the allies: ‘for the 
first time in history, two naval squadrons are totally integrated’ in what he called 
‘allied forces’. 454  Furthermore, he never expressed any reservations about the 
planned attack.455. 
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French officers regarded Guépratte, as they did de Robeck, as incompetent and 
careless with the lives of his men. Glory and honour appear to have been high on his 
personal agenda. His message of 21 March to de Robeck following the 18 March 
failure confirms this view. ‘My division has been placed at a splendid school of valour 
and devotion; under such conditions, we had an easy role, ruling our conduct on 
your splendid example and that on our noble brothers in arms of the British Fleet. It 
was enough to remain faithful to the honour and to the religion of sacrifice’.456 
Guépratte’s words indicate a strong degree of subservience and deprecation of the 
role of the French, especially when one considers the loss of Gaulois and six hundred 
men. Additionally, he committed the cardinal sin of criticising his own men to his 
allies. Keyes recorded:  
The French are miserable. They sent in the Mariotte (submarine) a 
few days ago…she has been sunk and the crew captured. Poor 
Millot is very unhappy—and Admiral Guépratte said today that 
they had taken such pride in their submarines service before the 
war and thought they were the best, [but] we [the British] went 
everywhere as we liked, our crews were splendid—they [the 
French] with the best intentions were always failing.457  
Although Guépratte was not the only French officer to make disparaging remarks 
about his own men, Boué de Lapeyrère too, according to Thursby, blamed French 
destroyer Captains for their ‘stupidity’ in allowing German submarines to escape.458 
Nevertheless, Guépratte appears to have ‘gone native’. Perhaps the degree to which 
Guépratte had indeed ‘become a British Admiral’ is indicted by Keyes in a letter to 
his wife bemoaning that: ‘They would not leave our dear Guépratte in command!’459 
The opening section of this paper noted that several factors required consideration: 
unity of intent; interoperability; burden sharing; decision-making; communication and 
equality of partnership. It has been shown that for every factor there was a 
fundamental or partial failure at the Dardanelles. There was no unity of intent 
between the allies with both pursuing diverse and antagonistic grand strategies but 
there were major issues at the operational level as well. In 1915, it would be 
unreasonable to expect the allies to achieve a full level of interoperability; indeed, as 
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NATO has shown, it takes decades of work to arrive at such a capability. Despite 
evidence that exchanges were made at staff level, many French officers took the view 
that the British had no interest in interoperability at all. In the matter of burden 
sharing it is also clear that there was considerable friction. The British strongly held 
the view that the French were not operationally up to the job and to make matters 
worse they attempted to take on as many jobs as possible despite their lack of means. 
However, it was undoubtedly the issue of command and control that caused the 
greatest friction. The British believed they simply did not need the French. That, and 
their sense of superiority, meant that the British took decisions without first 
consulting or including their ally and to compound matters then failed to 
communicate operational decisions effectively, if at all. There was absolutely no 
equality of partnership; a breach that the French felt very deeply. However, these 
failures of command and control could have been mitigated or eliminated altogether 
had a different French admiral been in post from the start. Guépratte, as a French 
admiral first and foremost, failed. He failed his own squadron and he failed France. A 
stronger French personality like Nicol might have provided a challenge to the 
dominance of the Royal Navy but instead Guépratte ‘went native’ obligingly following 
whatever the British did regardless of the damage to French interests, ships and men. 
Elizabeth Greenhalgh has made the point that through 1915: ‘British and French 
groped towards effective military cooperation [on the western front] during the 
opening months of the war, hindered by the many differences that divided them and 
by the prewar failure to establish the command relationship’.460This paper has 
demonstrated the extent to which this was also true at the Dardanelles. 
The most important lesson from the Dardanelles operation for contemporary naval 
coalition operations is that where any one partner is in a position of dominance it is 
vital that it recognise the interests of its junior partners and then ensures officers are 
educated in the avoidance of crude stereotypes and inherited misperceptions about 
allies which may become a decisive obstacle to efficient cooperation. Unified 
decision-making and above all effective communication with junior members is vital 
for success, especially political. It may often be the case that with modern naval 
coalitions, junior partners, even those offering niche capabilities, might not be 
regarded by the dominant partner as militarily important in overall terms to the 
conduct of the operation. However, politically, it is crucially important to recognise, 
not just the interests of the junior partners in the operational outcome, but that 
involving them fully within the command and control mechanism is vital to the 
success of the coalition overall. 
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